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ATKINS V. VIRGINIA:
IS EXECUTING THE MENTALLY RETARDED
CONSTITUTIONAL?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment's preclusion of cruel and unusual
punishment has been used to bar the execution of certain classes of
individuals in capital cases.' While state legislatures may decide whether
to adopt the death penalty, the U.S. Supreme Court has limited the
states' ability to execute minors and the insane because those
defendants' diminished capacity for reasoned judgment limits their
culpability.2 Recently, similar challenges to the constitutionality of
executing the mentally retarded have been presented.3
A recent challenge came to the U.S. Supreme Court in McCarver v.
North Carolina,4 but a bill signed by the Governor of North Carolina,
barring the execution of the mentally retarded, has rendered McCarver
moot.6 Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed McCarver on
September 25, 2001.' On the same day, the Court granted certiorari to
Virginia inmate Daryl Renard Atkins.8 The Court granted stays of
execution to two other inmates pending its decision in McCarver,9 but
1. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
2. See id. at 838 (holding that the purposes of capital punishment are not satisfied by
executing those under sixteen); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986) (questioning the
retributive value of executing the insane when they do not know why they are being
executed).
3. See generally Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 2000); State v. McCarver,
462 S.E.2d 25 (N.C. 1995).
4. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25.
5. See 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 346.
6. See Paul Duggan & Glenda Cooper, Court Asked to Dismiss N.C. Death Row Appea"
Ruling on Executing Retarded May Be Delayed, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2001, at A3. See also
Michael Kirkland, Court May Duck Executions of Retarded, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug. 7,
2001; Tony Mauro, Death Is Coming Into Court, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at 7; Tony
Mauro, Scalia Steps Out of High-Profile Death Case, RECORDER, Aug. 13,2001, at 3.
7. McCarver v. North Carolina, 2001 U.S. Lexis 5345 (Sept. 25,2001).
8. Atkins v. Virginia, 2001 U.S. Lexis 5356 (Sept. 25, 2001).
9. See Duggan & Cooper, supra note 6, at A3. "At least three other death row
inmates-James Atkins in Virginia, Glenn Holladay in Alabama and Antonio Richardson in
Missouri... have asked the Supreme Court to hear their.., appeals. The [C]ourt issued
stays of execution in Holladay's and Richardson's cases, pending a ruling in the McCarver
case." Id.
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ultimately it chose to address Atkins's petition. The Court granted
certiorari to Atkins in order to decide the following question: "Whether
the execution of mentally retarded individuals convicted of capital
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment."'0 While this question seems
fairly benign and straight forward, the Court's treatment of the
McCarver case suggests otherwise. The Court granted certiorari to
McCarver in order to decide Question One of McCarver's petition:
"Whether significant objective evidence demonstrates a societal
consensus against executing persons with mental retardation."" The
question's meaning by the invocation of a "societal consensus" is
unclear. The question is important because it provides some insight into
the standards that are implicated in the Court's consideration of Atkins.
When the Court has in the past considered "significant objective
evidence" 2 of societal consensus, it analyzed the historical roots of the
ban on cruel and unusual punishment, 3 the reduced intellectual and
psychological capabilities of the defendant,' the penological goals of
retribution and deterrence, 5 and state legislative consensus." What is
unclear is whether the Court granted certiorari to Atkins to merely
consider the societal consensus as reflected by state legislatures or
whether the broader analysis suggested by case law will be
determinative.
This Note will examine the Court's reasoning in the development of
Eighth Amendment law and determine how the Court should apply it to
the question presented in Atkins. Part II will begin by summarizing the
facts of Atkins. The application of Eighth Amendment law before
Atkins is discussed in Part III. Before concluding with Part V, Part IV
10. Atkins v. Virginia, 2001 U.S. Lexis 5463 (Oct. 1, 2001).
11. Petitioners Brief at i, McCarver v North Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001) (mem.)
(No. 00-8727). Petitioners Brief stated:
Whether significant objective evidence demonstrates a societal consensus against
executing persons with mental retardation, reflecting that (a) such persons are not
sufficiently personally culpable to merit the death penalty, and (b) allowing
sentences to weigh mental retardation as a mitigating factor in individual cases fails
to prevent the execution of persons whose vastly diminished capacity makes the
death penalty cruel and unusual.
Id.
12. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,331 (1989).
13. E.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406-07 (1986).
14. E.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 339.
15. E.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836-38 (1988) (plurality opinion).
16. E.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
[85:579
ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
of this Note will present an analysis of how and why the U.S. Supreme
Court should adopt a ban on executing the mentally retarded. This
Note urges that the Court abandon Justice O'Connor's analysis in Penry
v. Lynaugh: the only case in which the Court has considered precluding
execution of the mentally retarded. Limiting Atkins to a question of
state legislative consensus ignores the precedents that incorporate the
broad definition of "societal consensus." This Note will generally
assume that the "societal consensus" in Question One refers to evolving
standards of decency in which all Eighth Amendment case law is
fundamentally grounded.
II. FACTS OF ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
In 1998, Daryl Renard Atkins was tried and convicted for the capital
murder of Eric Michael Nesbitt in the Circuit Court of York County,
Virginia.'7 On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Atkins's
conviction," but because the verdict form did not give the jury the
option of life imprisonment when it considered sentence,' 9 the case was
remanded for a new penalty proceeding? On remand, a new jury once
again "fixed Atkins' punishment at death."2' Atkins appealed to
Virginia's highest court a second time." The Court subsequently found
no merit in any of Atkins's eight assignments of error and affirmed his
sentence.23
At Atkins's trial, the jury was provided with evidence that he has an
IQ of 59.2' Of particular significance was that Atkins "has the cognitive
ability or mental age of a child between 9 and 12 years of age."25 In the
first appeal, the court concluded that the trial court should have
instructed the jury to consider Atkins's mental retardation as mitigating
evidencef In the second appeal, the Court's proportionality review
found that Virginia had never executed someone with an IQ as low as
17. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312,314 (Va. 2000).
18. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445,457 (Va. 1999).
19. Id. at 456. "[T]he verdict form failed to provide the jury with the option of
sentencing Atkins to life imprisonment upon a finding that neither of the aggravating factors
of future dangerousness or vileness was proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
20. Id. at 457.
21. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 314.
22. See generally id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 319.
25. Id. at 323 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
26. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445,457 (Va. 1999).
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Atkins's. 7 Yet they declined to impose a life sentence "merely because
of his IQ score,"' 2 despite additional professional psychological
testimony that established that Atkins suffered from a "limited capacity
for adaptive behavior. ,2 9 At trial, imposition of capital punishment was
predicated on the jury finding "aggravating factors. "30
III. EVOLVING NATIONAL STANDARDS: EIGHTH AMENDMENT LAW
PRIOR TO ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
When addressing Eighth Amendment questions, the Court examines
current societal policies in light of "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."'" This allows the limitations
on cruel and unusual punishment to expand in order to apply to
practices that society formerly accepted, yet now finds repugnant. 2 An
examination of the Eighth Amendment's history, principles, and
applications is essential to any understanding of its relevance to the
execution of mentally retarded defendants.
A. The Common Law Prior to the Bill of Rights
In order to understand and apply the decidedly limited phraseology
used in the Eighth Amendment,33 the U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly attempted to gauge the Framers' intentions for including the
provision.3' English common law is often the starting point for the
Court's analysis into the Framers' reasons for including the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment in the Bill of Rights. 5
27. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 318.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 322 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
30. Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 453. The jury found that "Atkins both represented a future
danger to society and that the murder... [was] outrageously or wantonly vile." Id.
31. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
32. See id. at 330. "At a minimum, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment
considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted." Id.
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment in its entirety states:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." Id. See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988). "The
authors of the Eighth Amendment... made no attempt to define the contours of that
category." Id.
34. See Eric L. Shwartz, Penry v. Lynaugh "Idiocy" and the Framers' Intent Doctrine, 16
NEW ENG. J. ON GRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 315,328 (1990).
35. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 330-31 (examining the common law
prohibitions against executing "lunatics" and "idiots"); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406
(1986) (examining the common law prohibitions against executing the insane).
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The common law barred the execution of "idiots" and "lunatics. 36
The term "lunatic" was used to refer to the insane,37 while the term
"idiot" seemingly referred to the mentally retarded.3 Individuals who
fell into either one of these categories were not subject to capital
punishment because they were "not chargeable for their own acts. 39 An
additional reason for these prohibitions is that the execution of the
insane "provides no example to others and thus contributes nothing to
whatever deterrence value is intended to be served by capital
punishment.""o
B. Principles of Eighth Amendment Law
The protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment are not limited
to common law principles.41 Practices that were accepted at the time the
Bill of Rights was drafted may be prohibited if they are inconsistent with
"evolving standards of decency."'42 This is supposed to allow
contemporary law and moral standards to dictate whether a punishment
is cruel and unusual.43 If a punishment is challenged, the Court will
consider "objective evidence" when deciding if it is precluded by
contemporary moral standards."
C. Thompson and Ford: A Broad Application of "Societal Consensus"
Earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases that confronted Eighth
Amendment issues applied a broad spectrum of factors to determine
whether society's standards had evolved to preclude execution of certain
36. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331.
37. Id. at 301-02.
38. Id. at 332. "In its emphasis on a permanent, congenital mental deficiency, the old
common law notion of 'idiocy' bears some similarity to the modem definition of mental
retardation." Id. (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 331 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-*25); see also
Ford, 477 U.S. at 406 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra).
40. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407 (citing 3 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)).
41. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 330; See also Ford, 477 U.S. at 405. "There is now little room
for doubt that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at a
minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at
the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted." Id.
42. Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion)); Ford, 477 U.S. at 406; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 n.4 (1988)
(discussing the genesis of this phrase).
43. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821 (stating "future generations of judges" must "define
the contours" of cruel and unusual punishment).
44. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977) and
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,788-96 (1982)).
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classes of people. 5 While the Court included state legislative opinion in
these factors,' it was not ultimately dispositive.47 The common law s
penological goals,49 as well as knowledge from accepted professional
disciplines' were all considered.
In Ford v. Wainwright, overwhelming evidence that the common law
banned the execution of lunatics" was an important factor influencing
the Court's determination that the Eighth Amendment exempts the
insane from capital punishment.52 A Court survey of state legislatures
found that no state allowed the execution of the insane.53 The Court
noted that this information was indicative of how the common law's
"ancient and humane limitation upon the State's ability to execute its
sentences" had been applied in modern lawmaking."
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, Justice Stevens found a societal
consensus, but also utilized recommendations from psychiatrists,55 the
American Bar Association, the American Law Institute, and even the
laws of "other nations that share our Anglo-American Heritage""
before finding that the Eighth Amendment precludes executing a
person who at the time of the offense was under the age of sixteen.'
Justice Stevens concluded that the penological goals of retribution and
deterrence were not served by executing people under the age of sixteen
because of their lessened culpability. 8 Noting that "[t]he basis for this
conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation, "" the Court
nonetheless referenced a study of fourteen juveniles sentenced to
45. See generally Thompson, 487 U.S. 815; Ford, 477 U.S. 399.
46. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829 n.30; Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 n.2.
47. See generally Thompson, 487 U.S. 815; Ford, 477 U.S. 399.
48. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-07.
49. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836-38; Ford, 477 U.S. at 409.
50. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830, 835 n.42 (stating that, for example, the "American Bar
Association and the American Law Institute have formally expressed their opposition to the
death penalty for juveniles").
51. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-08.
52. Id. at 408-10.
53. Id. at 408 n.2.
54. Id. at 409.
55. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835 n.42.
56. Id. at 830.
57. Id. at 838 (limiting its analysis to the case before it involving a juvenile under the age
of sixteen at the time of his offense, and not determining whether to prohibit executions of all
persons under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense despite numerous amici curiae
advocating that position).
58. Id. at 836-38.
59. Id. at 835.
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death,'° and found that "[i]nexperience, less education, and less
intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of
his or her conduct."6 The use of legislative consensus was only a factor
in Thompson.6 Justice Stevens argued that the decision of whether to
impose the death penalty on a class of people, while influenced by
evidence of legislative action and jury determinations, is ultimately up to
the Court.6
D. Penry v. Lynaugh. A Narrow Standard
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the U.S. Supreme Court employed a survey of
"objective evidence" similar to that found in Thompson and Ford.'
Professional opinions were considered in Penry,o but the majority did
not find much merit in the evidence presented on appeal concerning the
disabilities of the mentally retarded." Since the Court questioned the
limited culpability that was implicated by evidence of lower levels of
intellectual functioning, it followed that the penological goals of
retribution and deterrence could be served by imposing the death
penalty on the mentally retarded.67 In his dissent, Justice Brennan
disagreed with Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the data and
60. Id. at 835 n.42 (citing LEWIS ET AL, NEUROPSYCHIATRIC, PYSCHOEDUCATIONAL
[SIC], AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS OF 14 JUVENILES CONDEMNED TO DEATH IN THE
UNITED STATES 11 (1987)).
61. Id. at 835.
62. See generally id.
63. Id. at 833.
64. Compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-40 (1989) (using other factors, but
ultimately focusing on legislative consensus since it did not find expert opinion dispositive),
with Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829-38 (using evidence from experts and professionals, as well as
legislative opinion, to decide if defendants under sixteen years old could have the requisite
culpability to warrant the death penalty), and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-10
(1986) (using legislative consensus and earlier common law principles to conclude that the
Constitution bars executing the insane).
65. Penry, 492 U.S. at 335. The Court was presented with an amicus brief from the
American Association on Mental Retardation opposing the execution of the mentally
retarded. Id. Other groups submitted similar amicus briefs. Id. at 336. This brief argued
"that all mentally retarded people, regardless of their degree of retardation, have substantial
cognitive and behavioral disabilities that reduce their level of blameworthiness for a capital
offense." Id.
66. See id. at 338-40 (questioning the accuracy of "mental age" assessments used by the
American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) and noting the "diverse capacities
and life experiences" of the mentally retarded).
67. See id. at 338-39. "In light of the diverse capacities and life experiences of mentally
retarded persons, it cannot be said on the record before us today that all mentally retarded
people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability associated with the death
penalty." Id.
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believed that the modern evidence submitted by the American
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) demonstrated that
common impairments in adaptive ability relieve the mentally retarded
of the degree of culpability necessary to deserve a death sentence.6
Writing for the majority in Penry, Justice O'Connor felt that the
common law prohibition against executing "idiots" only applied to
people who would be considered "profound[ly]" or "severe[ly]"
mentally retarded by current standards.69 She felt that the profoundly or
severely mentally retarded would find sanctuary from conviction and
capital punishment in the established insanity defense.70 Four justices in
Penry believed the AAMR's definition should replace this common law
definition of mental retardation. 1 Justice Brennan asserted that the
AAMR definition included common deficiencies among the mentally
retarded, which reduce their culpability as a class of people.7 This
definition, therefore, makes such distinctions between "severe" and
"mild" irrelevant.
Consequently, the Penry Court found that the consensus of the state
legislatures provides the "clearest and most reliable objective evidence
of contemporary values."73 Justice O'Connor found that only two states
had specifically outlawed the execution of the mentally retarded, so
there was no national consensus.74 The Court further noted that it
would give credence to other factors, such as "data concerning the
actions of sentencing juries"75 and the "decisions of prosecutors." 76 Since
68. Id. at 346 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. Id. at 333. O'Connor's argument; therefore, implicitly accepts that there are
gradations, or degrees, of mental retardation. For support of this view, see Lyn Entzeroth,
Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a
National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 911, 913 (2001). The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) identifies four categories of mental retardation: mild
(IQ 50-55 to approximately 70), moderate (IQ 35-40 to 50-55), severe (IQ 20-25 to 35-40)
and profound (IQ below 20-25). Id.
70. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333.
71. Id. at 344-45 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 349-50
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72 Id. at 345-46.
73. Id. at 331.
74. Id. at 334 (finding no national consensus despite the fact that two states expressly
outlawed the execution of the mentally retarded and fourteen other states had rejected
capital punishment altogether).
75. Id. at 331 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-96 (1982)); see also
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 (1988) (plurality opinion).
76. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
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there was no national consensus against the practice, the Court decided
the execution of the mentally retarded was not unconstitutional.'
IV. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS A COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF
"NATIONAL CONSENSUS"
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Penry focused on
state legislative consensus, it adhered to precedent by examining
relevant factors of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 8 Thompson and
Ford also held that courts should look beyond legislative consensus. 9 In
Thompson, Justice Stevens said, "[a]lthough the judgments of
legislatures, juries and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for
us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits
imposition of the death penalty."'O When the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari in McCarver,1 prior analysis suggests it meant to
address the broader factors that are essential to any effective analysis of
Eighth Amendment claims, and not a narrow application of the phrase
"societal consensus." Otherwise, the Court might ignore the precedents
set in Penry, Thompson and Ford.'
A. A Legislative Consensus Exists Against Executing the Mentally
Retarded
When Penry was decided, only two states and the federal
government had enacted legislation banning the execution of convicted
mentally retarded people.' When the U.S. Supreme Court hears
arguments in Atkins, at least seventeen more states will have been
77. Id. at 340.
78. See supra Part HI.D.
79. See supra Part HI.C.
80. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797). The genesis of this
proposition goes back to Marbury v. Madison. Id. at 833 n.40 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."). Judge Chapel's partial dissent in Lambert v. State stands
for the similar proposition that "[tlo suggest that the issue in today's opinion can or ought to
be decided by the legislature, while politically correct in some circles, is patently absurd." 984
P.2d 221, 240 n.2 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (Chapel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
81. McCarver v. North Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001) (mem.).
82. See supra Part III.C.
83. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989). When Penry was decided, Georgia had
a statute banning the execution of the mentally retarded, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j)
(1997) (precluding application of death penalty to the mentally retarded in any case
commencing on or after July 1, 1988), and Maryland had enacted legislation, MD. CODE
ANN., art. 27, § 412(f)(1) (1989), that was to take effect ten months later. Id.
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added to this number." Combine these nineteen with the twelve states
that have banned the death penalty altogether," and over half of the
states outlaw imposition of the death penalty upon the mentally
retarded. When Ford banned the execution of the insane, no state
permitted the death penalty for the insane, and twenty-six states
required the suspension of a capital sentence if the prisoner became
insane before the sentence was carried out. Moreover, the Thompson
Court found that eighteen states had established a minimum age in their
death penalty legislation.8 Given these statistics, there is a compelling
argument that a national legislative consensus against executing the
mentally retarded has indeed been reached. However, a survey of
legislative consensus does not consider the goals of retribution and
deterrence.
B. The English Common Law Supports a Ban on the Execution of the
Mentally Retarded
Justice O'Connor's assessment of the common law bar on executing
"idiots"" is flawed. Four justices in Penry believed the AAMR
definition should replace the common law definition of mental
retardation.' Justice O'Connor's reliance on the old common law
definitions of mental retardation failed to take into account the
"contemporary values" standard she attempted to apply. Justice
Brennan asserted that evidence of common deficiencies among the
mentally retarded reduces their culpability as a class of people, and
84. Entzeroth, supra note 69, at 929 n.175, accumulated the relevant state statutes
barring the execution of the mentally retarded: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West
2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 54-618(b) (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-19-403
(West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310) (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-6
(Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(d) (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.140(1)
(Banks-Baldwin 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN § 28-105.01(2) (Michie Supp. 2000); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(B) (Michie 2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(c) (Consol.
1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (Michie Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-203(b) (1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(2) (West 1993). Since the time of her
article's publication, however, numerous states have enacted or are considering enacting
similar laws: 2001 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 13-703 (West); 2001 Conn. Legis. Serv. 53a-46a(i) (West);
2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 921.137 (West); 2001 Miss. S. B. 2654; 2001 Mo. S. B. 267; and 2001
N.C. Sess. Laws 346.
85. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Take Up Issue of Executing Retarded Killers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2001, at Al.
86. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,408 & n.2 (1986).
87. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 829 (1988) (plurality opinion).
88. See supra Part III.D.
89. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 341, 344-45 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 349-50 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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makes such arbitrary distinctions between "severe" and "mild"
irrelevant."° Justice O'Connor's assessment of this evidence in Penry has
been refuted by scholars who contend the common law understanding of
"idiot" included the mildly mentally retarded.9'
As mentioned earlier in this Note, evolving standards build on
common law ideas of what constituted cruel and unusual punishment.'
Therefore, if the execution of "idiots" was not allowed at common law,
then current evidence of public opinion,' professional testimony,95 which
demonstrates that all mentally retarded individuals have "substantial
disability in cognitive ability and adaptive behavior," 96 and the growing
number of states barring the execution of the mentally retarded since
Penry,' is surely enough to allow current law to be updated to include
mentally retarded people among those barred from capital punishment.
C. Modem Understanding and Analysis Adequately Assess Mental
Retardation
Justice O'Connor's belief that retribution and deterrence might still
be served on the mentally retarded reflects her belief that current
modes of assessing mental retardation are inaccurate.9 The law has
fallen behind society's standards by refusing to acknowledge
90. See id. at 345. "In light of this clinical definition of mental retardation, I cannot
agree that the undeniable fact that mentally retarded persons have 'diverse capacities and life
experiences' is of significance to the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis we must
conduct in this case." Id. (citation omitted).
91. Shwartz, supra note 34, at 330. Of particular relevance is a reference to Sir Edward
Coke (1552-1634), the "greatest common lawyer in the history of English jurisprudence." Id.
(citation omitted). Coke recognized two degrees of "idiocy," roughly corresponding to
today's categories of the mentally retarded, yet he would have believed that both conditions
precluded capital punishment. Id.
92. See supra Part III.B.
93. See supra Part III.A.
94. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35. "For example, a poll taken in Texas found that 86% of
those polled supported the death penalty, but 73% opposed its application to the mentally
retarded." Id. See also Bryan Lester Dupler, Another Look at Evolving Standards: Will
Decency Prevail Against Executing the Mentally Retarded?, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 593, 604-09
(1999) (discussing recent nationwide polls that show an overwhelming consensus against
executing the mentally retarded).
95. See supra Part III.C-D (including psychiatrists and the American Association on
Mental Retardation among others).
96. Penry, 492 U.S. at 345 (quoting Amici Curiae Brief of the American Association on
Mental Retardation et al. 5-9,13-15).
97. See supra Part IV.A.




professional advice from the AAMR. Justice Brennan found
considerable merit in the AAMR's amicus brief, which noted that
mentally retarded people have common "'intellectual impairments... in
logical reasoning, strategic thinking, and foresight,' the lack of the
intellectual and developmental predicates of an 'ability to anticipate
consequences,' and 'impairment in the ability to control impulsivity.' ,,o,
These characteristics bear a striking resemblance to the juvenile
characteristics that Justice Stevens found in Thompson that lessen
juveniles' culpability.101 But the Penry majority chose to hold the ability
of the mentally retarded to improve their situation against them,"o
encouraging the same disempowerment of the mentally retarded that
they wanted to avoid.1"
D. The Execution of the Mentally Retarded does Not Satisfy Penological
Goals
Retribution and deterrence are at the core of any analysis of capital
punishment. In his Penry dissent, Justice Brennan noted that because of
the common impediments that afflict all mentally retarded people, the
mentally retarded lack the requisite moral culpability, which is a
"prerequisite to the proportionate imposition of the death penalty. ' 1°4
He went on to say, "execution can never be the 'just deserts' of a
retarded offender."°" Justice Brennan also concluded that executing the
mentally retarded fails to deter other mentally retarded persons from
committing capital crimes."' These inherent deficiencies will prevent
the mentally retarded from considering the risk of capital punishment
100. Id. at 348-49 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Amici
Curiae Brief of the American Association on Mental Retardation et al. 6-7).
101. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (plurality opinion). Justice
Stevens quoted a passage formerly quoted by Justice Powell in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982), stating that youth "generally are less mature and responsible than
adults." Id. Furthermore, Justice Powell quoted a passage from the 1978 Report of the
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders that
stated that adolescents are "more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self disciplined than
adults." Id.; see also supra Part III.C.
102. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 338 (stating that the mentally retarded have varying degrees
of mental retardation, and are "capable of learning, working, and living in their
communities") (quoting Amici Curiae Brief for the American Association on Mental
Retardation et al. 6).
103. See id. at 340 (stating that reliance on mental age to measure the capabilities of the
mentally retarded could effect their rights to contract or marry).
104. Id. at 348 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).




when making assessments of their activity."' Justice Brennan concluded
that the penological goals of capital punishment are not satisfied, and to
execute the mentally retarded would be "nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering."" That
Justice Brennan engaged in this analysis is not surprising. He followed
the same steps previously used in Thompson'09 and Ford."0 The Ford
Court's inquiry into the reasons for the historical ban on such
punishments yielded to a long held principle that the goals of capital
punishment have never been served by executing insane people."' The
Court concluded by questioning "the retributive value of executing a
person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and
stripped of his fundamental right to life,""' and found the execution of
the insane unconstitutional." The same analysis applies to the question
presented in Atkins, and the Court should hold accordingly.
E. A Per Se Bar to Execution
The Eighth Amendment significantly affects the procedural aspects
of the death penalty,"4 and the sentencing phase in this process is no
exception. All evidence of mental retardation should be examined at
the sentencing phase of a capital trial. In an insanity defense,
procedures are used to gauge the sanity of the defendant and are
therefore important when determining whether the Constitution
prohibits the execution of the defendant."5 Since there are inherent
similarities between insanity and mental retardation,' similar
procedures are also necessarily implicated when evidence of a mental
defect is presented. The Court has recognized the need for a
"heightened standard of reliability" in the fact-finding procedures of
capital proceedings."' This heightened standard should be implemented
at the above-discussed sentencing phase of a capital trial. If the
107. Id. at 349.
108. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977)).
109. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,831-38 (1988) (plurality opinion).
110. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,409 (1986).
111. Id. at 408.
112. Id. at 409.
113. Id. at 401.
114. Id. at 405.
115. Id.
116. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 332 (1989) (noting that the insanity defense
includes "mental disease" as well as "mental defect").
117. Ford, 477 U.S. at 411 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,456 (1984)).
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sentencer finds that a defendant suffers from mental retardation,
nothing more than a life sentence should be imposed.
V. CONCLUSION
A class of defendants whose inherent disability reduces their
culpability should not be subjected to capital punishment. If the U.S.
Supreme Court utilizes all of the Eighth Amendment standards it has at
its disposal, it will be apparent that the Constitution bars the execution
of the mentally retarded. Further, if the Court limits its inquiry to an
analysis of state legislative consensus, it will largely ignore other factors
it has previously found to be relevant and continue to defy the societal
consensus against such executions. The U.S. Supreme Court has more
compelling evidence before it than a simple tally of state legislative
opinion.
OLIVER KAUFMAN*
* The author would like to thank his family, The Replacements, and the EE-Sane Thai
Restaurant.
[85:579
